Wettbewerb und systemisches Risiko in der VR China seit der Öffnung des Bankensektors 1995
(Competition, Concentration and Systemic Risk in the Chinese Banking System since 1995)
Bachelor’s thesis, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Chemnitz University of Technology, July 2025. Supervisor: Prof. Torsten Heinrich. Second examiner: Prof. Tony Klein. Written in German.
Abstract
Drawing on a systematic literature review and official regulatory reports, this thesis analyses the relationship between (de)regulation, competition, market concentration, and systemic risk in Chinese banking between 1995 and 2024. It first examines how deregulation affected competition, concentration, and risk structures, and then how competition and market concentration in turn affect systemic risk. It closes with regulatory options and recommendations for supervisory authorities. Deregulation is found to raise competition, lower concentration, and shift the structure of risk. Competition dampens systemic risk, in line with the competition-stability view, whereas market concentration works in both directions at once, with evidence for concentration-stability as well as concentration-fragility. Separating competition from market concentration proves indispensable; medium-sized banks are disproportionately relevant for systemic risk through their behaviour. Prudential measures are suitable for reducing systemic risk in Chinese banking but carry relevant side effects, and other regulatory measures can influence systemic risk indirectly.
